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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

BILLY ARELLANO,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 970347-CA
Priority No. 2

:

ARGUMENT
I. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY
ESTABLISH ARELLANO'S KNOWING AND INTENTIONAL
POSSESSION OF COCAINE.
A. Case Law From Other Jurisdictions Directly
Addressing The Issue Of This Case Is Relevant To
This Court's Analysis.
The State asserts that circumstantial evidence establishes
that Arellano knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine, noting
that the "timing, location, and method of transfer [] established
a preplanned scheme."

State's Brief ("S.B.") at 12-19.

However,

Arellano's fleeting, physical contact with the envelope, without
other manifestations of his dominion and control over the cocaine
within, did not sufficiently establish knowing and intentional
possession.

See, e.g.. United States v. Kitchen, 57 F.3d 516, 522,

reh'cr denied,
cocaine

did

(7th Cir. 1995) (2-3 second physical contact with
not

establish

intent

to

possess

absent

other

circumstances to that effect); Loudermilk v. State, 523 N.E.2d 769,
771 (Ind. App. 1988) (no possession where defendant held bag of
marijuana for seven seconds but did not otherwise show intent to
possess); see Appellant's Brief ("A.B.") at 15-19.
The State bases its claim upon the well-founded principle

that evidence of intent is rarely susceptible of direct proof and
must be inferred from the given circumstances.

See S.B. 13 (citing

State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991); State v. Emmett. 839
P.2d 781, 784

(Utah 1992); State v. Smith, 728 P.2d 1014

1986); State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah App. 1990)).

(Utah

To this

end, the State dismisses as "inapposite" Arellano's reference to
Kitchen, Loudermilk, and similar case law from other jurisdictions
which

hold

that momentary

physical

contact

with

a

controlled

substance, without more, does not establish knowing and intentional
possession.

See S.B. 13.

Such case law is relevant, however.

Arellano agrees that

intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence and cites Utah
case law to that effect.

See A.B. 15.

Nonetheless, case law from

other jurisdictions is instructive since Utah cases, including
those cited by the State, do not squarely address the facts and
issue of this case, i.e., to what extent intent to possess may be
inferred from brief contact with contraband without departing from
the due process requirement that prohibited conduct be defined and
that the government prove each element of an offense beyond a
reasonable doubt.

See A.B. 14, 18-19 (citing Kolender v. Lawson,

461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)).
Utah courts frequently look to other jurisdictions

for

guidance where, as here, the issue is novel and where outside case
law is consistent with the analytical framework provided for under
Utah law.

See, e.g. , State v. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149, 1156
2

(Utah

App. 1994)(citing federal case law in interpreting Utah Code Ann.
§

61-1-1);

State

v.

Archuleta,

857

P.2d

234,

240

(Utah

1993) (looking to other jurisdictions in determining whether common
law grants access to documents in criminal matters); Provo City v.
Warden,

844

P.2d

360, 363

(Utah App.

1992) (relying

on

jurisdictions in assessing stop under Fourth Amendment).
the

analysis

under

Kitchen

and

Loudermilk

comports

other

In fact,
with

the

existing framework employed in Utah; the additional manifestations
of intent required under Kitchen and Loudermilk fall under the
rubric

of

"circumstantial

proof"

possession provided for in Utah.

of

knowing

and

intentional

Accordingly, this Court may look

to cases like Kitchen and Loudermilk without departing from Utah
precedent.
B. Arellano's Culpable Intent Is Not Established
By The Fact That He Immediately Dropped The
Envelope When Summoned By The Prison Guards.
In explaining how the circumstances

establish

culpable

intent, the State relies, in part, upon the fact that Arellano
immediately dropped the envelope when summoned by the prison guards
and that such was a sign of his "guilty knowledge."

See S.B. 18.

Contrary to the State's assertion, any reasonable person would drop
the envelope out of nervousness when called upon by an officer,
especially in a heavily policed environment like a prison.
A.B.

19-20.

Nervous

behavior

upon

an

officer's

See

unsolicited

attention is as consistent with innocence as it is with guilt.

Id.

(citing State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah App. 1992)).
Moreover, under facts far more incriminating than those
3

involved here, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that flight or
concealment is not evidence of "premeditation or intent.

Flight or

concealment shows the guilty conscience of the accused as a result
of the crime committed.

It does not show the state of mind prior

to the criminal act or event."

State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789

(Utah 1991) (fact that baby was found dead, wrapped in cloth and
left in marsh, did not establish defendant's guilt for murder); see
also State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983) (fact that defendant
fled when

called

by officer

did not

establish

his guilt

for

robbery) . Accordingly, " [o]ther evidence of the defendant's intent
must be present in the record to support the jury's verdict."
at 790.

Id.

The fact that Arellano let go of the envelope merely

establishes

that,

based

on

the

officers'

swift

response,

he

understood that something was wrong with the envelope and dropped
it accordingly.

This fact, however, in and of itself, does not

establish his "guilty knowledge."
II. ARELLANO MADE A CREDIBLE SHOWING OF NEED AND
PREJUDICE WARRANTING A CONTINUANCE OR EXCLUSION OF
TESTIMONY WHERE THE STATE FAILED TO PROVIDE TIMELY
NOTICE OF ITS EXPERT WITNESS.
The State asserts on two grounds that Arellano was not
entitled

to

testimony

of

either

a

continuance

Jennifer McNair

or

exclusion

("McNair"),

the

of

the

State

expert

crime

lab

technician who proposed to identify as cocaine the substance found
within the envelope and who prepared a toxicology report to this
effect.

See S.B. 20-27.
First, the State claims that, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §

77-17-13

(1995),

Arellano

had
4

adequate

notice

of

McNair's

testimony:

Arellano

received

McNair's

toxicology

report

identifying her as the preparing technician almost two months
before trial, and such report (which he did not stipulate to) was
the only evidence of a "controlled substance" for purposes of a
charge of possession within a correctional facility.
21.

See S.B. 20-

Second, assuming the State did violate section 77-17-13, the

State asserts that Arellano failed to demonstrate sufficient need
of or prejudice meriting exclusion or a continuance.

Id. at 25.

Each point shall be addressed in turn.
A.
The
State Did Not
Satisfy
The
Notice
Requirements
Of
Section
77-17-13
By Merely
Providing The Toxicology Report To Arellano.
Contrary

to

the

State's

first

challenge,

the

bare

toxicology report did not constitute adequate notice under section
77-17-13.

The State quotes statutory language out of context in

stating that

"information provided by the proponent

of expert

testimony must be 'sufficient to give the opposing party adequate
notice to prepare to meet the testimony.'"
Code

Ann.

§

77-17-13 (1) (b) ) .

That

S.B. 23 (quoting Utah

portion

of

the

statute,

subsection (1) (b) , refers specifically to the report to be prepared
by the expert herself and provided to the opposing party so as to
inform

the

testimony.

opposing

party

of

the

substance

of

the

proposed

In situations where such a report is not yet available,

the legislature deemed it appropriate that a party may temporarily
provide a written synopsis "sufficient to give the opposing party
notice to prepare to meet the testimony."
13(1) (b) .
5

Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-

This language relied upon by the State, however, cannot
substitute for the remainder of a party's duty under subsection
(1)(a) of the same statute, which is to provide the name, address
and resume of the proposed expert within thirty days of trial.

See

Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(1) (a) ("Notice shall include the name and
address of the expert, the expert's curriculum vitae, and a copy of
the expert's report").

Where the prosecution failed to notify

Arellano that McNair would testify within the thirty day time
limit, and likewise failed to provide McNair's resume to Arellano,
it violated its statutory duty.

R. 118 [17, 23] . Accordingly, the

State's assertion that Arellano received adequate notice required
under section 77-17-13 is incorrect.
B. Arellano Demonstrated Need And Prejudice
Meriting The Statutory Remedy Of Either A
Continuance Or Exclusion Of Proposed Testimony
Pursuant To Section 77-17-13.
The State contends that Arellano has not demonstrated a
"legitimate

need

for

a

continuance"

or

sufficient

prejudice

warranting either a continuance or exclusion of untimely disclosed
expert testimony pursuant to section 77-17-13.

See S.B. at 22-26;

see also State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527, 530

(Utah

App. 1997)

(including need and prejudice among factors for consideration in
determining when continuance or exclusion is warranted under § 7717-13) .
A

trial

court's

decision

to

grant

or

deny

either

a

continuance or exclusion of evidence under section 77-17-13 is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

Begishe, 937 P. 2d at 530.

However, in cases involving untimely disclosed evidence, the scope
6

of this standard of review is limited by the fact that the record
necessarily lacks information which would enable reviewing courts
to assess the "nature or magnitude of the resulting prejudice to
the defense."

State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987).

As

noted by the Knight Court,
[W] hen
. . . the error consists of the
prosecutions's failure to provide a defendant with
inculpatory evidence, the record does not provide
much assistance in discovering the nature or
magnitude of the resulting prejudice to the
defense. The record cannot reveal how knowledge
of this evidence would have affected the actions
of defense counsel, either in preparing for trial
or in presenting the case to the jury. To a large
extent
this leaves the reviewing
court to
speculate whether, absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood that the defense would have
adduced other evidence which, when considered in
light of the evidence actually presented, would
have produced a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's guilt.
Id. at 920-21.
Noting "the difficulties posed by the record's silence in
cases

involving

a

wrongful

failure

to

disclose

inculpatory

evidence," the Knight Court determined that a defendant need not
establish

prejudice

conclusively,

but

only

make

a

"credible

argument that the prosecutor's errors have impaired the defense."
Id. at 921 (finding credible defendant's showing of prejudice due
to prosecutor's

failure

argument" means

that

sufficient
outcome

of

to

the defendant

"erode[]

[the]

to disclose

a reviewing

trial" by

a

witnesses).

A

"credible

has demonstrated

prejudice

court's

"likelihood

7

confidence
greater

than

in

the

fifty

percent."

Id. at 919-20.x

Under the foregoing standard of review, Arellano has made
a credible showing of need, as well as sufficient prejudice to
merit

either

a

continuance

or

exclusion

of

McNair's

expert

testimony.
With regard to need, Arellano asserts that a continuance
would have allowed him to explore McNair's proposed testimony as it
relates to chain of custody and her qualifications to test the
substance.

R. 119 [20] ; A.B. 36.

The State counters that Arellano

failed to demonstrate a "legitimate need for a continuance" since
he did not contest either chain or McNair's qualifications at trial
or on appeal and that, in any event, "the chain of custody issue
ha[s] nothing to do with [McNair's] testimony that the substance
she tested was cocaine."
Contrary

to

S.B. 22, 24-25.
the

State's

assertion,

McNair's

qualifications to conduct the testing and her testimony regarding
chain of custody are pertinent to Arellano's defense. As discussed
in Arellano's opening brief, McNair and the prison guards each gave

1

The State asserts that Arellano defeats his own "matterof-law" argument in briefing prejudice in his opening brief. See
S.B. 21-22. However, Arellano's "matter-of-law" argument, see
A.B. 25-28, is consistent with the abuse-of-discretion standard
of review to the extent that a trial court is limited in its
discretion to act when one party fails to disclose inculpatory
information. The trial court may either grant a continuance or
exclude the proposed evidence; other action or inaction amounts
to an abuse of discretion under section 77-17-13. The fact that
a reviewing court's ability to assess prejudice is limited by the
silence of the record underscores how, as a matter of law, a
party becomes entitled to either a continuance or exclusion of
testimony upon another party's failure to timely disclose
pursuant to section 77-17-13.
8

differing testimony as to the color of the substance.

See A.B. 36.

Moreover, the initial test results identified the substance as
methaqualone whereas later test results showed the substance to be
cocaine.

Id.

Hence, legitimate questions as to chain of custody

and/or McNair's qualifications to conduct accurate testing exist.
Ultimately, these questions go to the identity of the substance
itself, an element of the crime of possession within a correctional
facility that must be established in order to convict Arellano.
See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8

(Supp. 1997)

(making it "unlawful:

for any person to knowingly and intentionally possess

. . .

a

controlled substance . . . [within] any correctional facility").
However, Arellano was denied an adequate opportunity to explore
those questions at trial when he was compelled to cross-examine
McNair without time to prepare his defense.
With regard to prejudice, the State asserts that Arellano
was not prejudiced by the denial of the continuance or alternative
exclusion of McNair's testimony since he could have reasonably
anticipated that she would testify.

Specifically, the State notes

that McNair's name was on the toxicology report that Arellano
received two months prior to trial; that the report was the only
evidence identifying the substance as cocaine for purposes of a
charge of possession within a correctional facility; that Arellano
should have known that the State would be required to present
accompanying expert testimony at trial since he did not stipulate
to the report at the preliminary hearing; and that in any event
rebuttal expert testimony would not have changed the outcome of the
9

trial in light of other evidence presented by the State.

See S.B.

24-26.
Contrary to the State's characterization of the evidence,
McNair's report was not the only evidence presented by the State
identifying the substance within the envelope.

Other evidence

proffered by the State included the testimony of Mike Spilker, an
evidence

specialist

for

the

Department

of

Corrections,

who

conducted a field test which established that the substance was
cocaine.
test,

In addition, Sergeant White testified that another field

administered

by

Lieutenant

substance as methaqualone.

Haverneck,

identified

the

119 [47-49, 140, 143, 150].

Accordingly, the State's assertion that Arellano should
have prepared to meet McNair's testimony since it was the
evidence of substance identity is not well founded.

only

Given the

other evidence identifying a "controlled substance" for purposes of
the

possession

charge,

Arellano

displayed

due

diligence

in

investing his time and resources in meeting the aforementioned
testimony, especially where the State did not timely verify that it
would additionally call McNair pursuant to its statutory duty.

See

A.B. 33-34; see also Begishe, 937 P.2d at 530 (defendant reasonably
relied

upon

determining

statutory
that

State

assurance
would

pursuant

notify

if

to

§

intending

77-17-13
to

in

present

evidence).
The

State

further

challenges

Arellano's

showing

of

prejudice on the basis that a rebuttal expert would not materially
enhance Arellano's defense that he did not recognize the cocaine
10

within the envelope when he picked it up given the testimony of
other officers who stated that the amount involved was minute and
not discernible to the naked eye.

See S.B. 24-26.

The State underestimates the impact of McNair's testimony.
McNair corroborated previous officer testimony to the extent that
she identified the substance as cocaine and stated that it weighed
approximately fifty milligrams. R. 119 [166-67] . However, McNair's
testimony also led juror's beyond to the conclusion that the amount
involved was nonetheless more than "residue."

R. 119 [166-68].

McNair described the amount as a "pinch of flour" and thus "easy to
see and recognize as an amount of something."

R. 119 [167] .

Utah courts have long recognized the tendency of jurors to
give

greater

testimony.

weight

to

expert

opinion

than

to

other

witness

See, e.g., State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 396 (Utah

1989); State v. Iorg, 801 P.2d 938, 941-42 (Utah App. 1990); State
v. Jacques, 924 P.2d 898, 903 n.4 (Utah App. 1996).

By the same

token, the testimony of McNair, the only testifying expert in this
case, could have resolved the juror's minds to the conclusion that
Arellano must have known that the envelope he picked up contained
cocaine, i.e., a recognizable
where

the balance

of

"amount of something", especially

the evidence

concerning

his knowing

and

intentional possession of the cocaine within the sealed envelope is
ambiguous.
921

See A.B. Point I, 12-24; see also Knight, 734 P.2d at

(recognizing

increased

risk

of

prejudice

where

surprise

testimony is "pivotal").
Where Arellano was denied either a continuance during which
11

he

could

adequately

prepare

to

meet

McNair's

testimony,

or

exclusion of the testimony altogether, the outcome of his trial was
likely

impacted

prejudice

to

to his detriment by her expert opinion.
Arellano

may

not

be

conclusively

The

apparent.

Nonetheless, where the evidence of Arellano's guilt was otherwise
in question and McNair's expert opinion suggested that the quantity
of cocaine was definitely recognizable to Arellano as "an amount of
something," it should not be presumed that Arellano's defense was
unaffected by his inability to prepare and meet such evidence.

As

noted by the Knight Court:
We cannot determine with any certainty from the
record
whether,
absent
the
prosecutor's
nondisclosures, the defense would have been better
prepared to meet the [] testimony. However, the
contention that the defense was caught off-guard
and was denied sufficient time to explore ways of
meeting the [] testimony rings true, and we
certainly cannot say that advance notice would not
have led to the introduction of other evidence
that would have undermined their statements.
Moreover, . . . the [] testimony was apparently
pivotal to the jury's conviction of Knight. . . .
Given the centrality of this testimony, the
possible denial of adequate opportunity to meet it
assumes heightened importance when evaluating
whether the defense might have been impaired.
Id. at 921.

The likelihood of prejudice in this case is further

underscored by the fact that McNair's testimony was that of an
expert.

"[A]ppellate courts are reluctant to find errors harmless

when they concern opinions given by experts given . . . that jurors
tend to give great weight to such testimony."

Jacques, 924 P. 2d at

903 n.4.
The prejudice to Arellano is not mitigated by the fact that
he was able to cross-examine McNair since his cross-examination was
12

unprepared.

Knight, 734 P.2d at 922 (finding prejudice although

defendant "vigorously" cross-examined surprise witnesses).
not know what additional

impeachment

"We do

evidence might have been

submitted to the jury if the defense had seen the

[witnesses]

statements before trial and had prepared to discredit [them].
cannot

presume

unaffected."

that

the

events

at

trial

would

have

We
been

Id.

Since Arellano has made a credible showing of prejudice,
the State must establish that "there is no reasonable likelihood
that absent the error, the outcome of trial would have been more
favorable for the defendant."
P. 2d at 531 n.5.

Id. at 921; see also Becrishe, 937

The State has not addressed this issue in its

response brief, excusing itself from its duty based on its own
assessment that Arellano did not adequately demonstrate prejudice
in the first place.

See S.B. 26 n.10.

failed to meet its burden on appeal.

The State, therefore, has

Where Arellano demonstrated

prejudice and the State has not refuted this showing, Arellano is
entitled to either a continuance or exclusion of McNair's testimony
pursuant to section 77-17-13 and Begishe, 937 P.2d at 530-31.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Arellano requests this Court to
reverse his conviction for insufficient evidence.

In the event

that this Court decides that sufficient evidence exists, Arellano
requests that his conviction be reversed and the case remanded
for a new trial due to the State's untimely notice regarding its
expert witness.
13

SUBMITTED this XOiL
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CATHERINE L. BEGIC
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